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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
We conduct an empirical analysis on the impact of the United States (US) 
antidumping actions against the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the 
bilateral trade and US imports from other trade partners. Using the data set 
based on the Harmonized System (HS) tariff code, we examine the trade 
patterns of the PRC and other countries, and find evidence for the trade 
restriction effect and the trade diversion effect. Further, we examine the intensity 
and duration of both restriction and diversion effects. The antidumping measures 
have effectively raised the prices of imports from the PRC and reduced US 
imports from the PRC only in the short term. Nevertheless, due to the 
coexistence of trade diversion effects, the overall remedy effect of antidumping 
actions on domestic industries is considerably limited. In addition, we investigate 
other factors that influence the efficiency of antidumping measures, such as the 
antidumping duty amount, the PRC’s market position in the US, and the US 
market share in the PRC. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: antidumping duty, trade diversion effect, trade restriction effect,  
the PRC 
 
JEL classification: F12, F13, F14  
 
 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years, invisible trade barriers have been frequently implemented to protect specific 
industry in local economy among many countries. The World Trade Organization (WTO) 
imposes strict requirements to qualify for tariffs protection via escape clause and tariffs will be 
granted only if rising imports are the most important cause of injury to the domestic industry. 
This criterion is difficult enough to establish that escape clause protection is not used frequently. 
 
Alternatively, firms can file for import protection under the “antidumping” provision of the 
WTO. Antidumping deals with cases where it is believed that a foreign firm is selling goods in 
the home (importing) market at either a lower price than in its own market, or if there is no 
foreign prices to observe, then at less than its average costs of production. The criterion for 
antidumping case is much easier to meet than that for the escape clause case and it does not 
require the additional approval of the president. WTO member countries gradually adopted 
nontariff barriers as new trade protection strategies. The withdrawn and settled cases result in a 
significant increase in market prices, with losses for consumers in usual cases. These barriers 
are not only effective, but much concealed. There are three different categories of invisible 
barriers: antidumping, technical barriers, and environmental barriers. Undoubtedly, antidumping 
is the most direct measure; therefore, it gets the most attention. 
 
The trade friction between the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—the largest targeting 
economy of antidumping, and the United States (US)—one of the leaders in increasing 
antidumping activities, naturally draws our attention. The PRC has been subject to antidumping 
investigation initiated mainly by the European Union (EU), India, and the US. Important 
questions that are well worth in-depth analysis can be whether the antidumping actions of these 
countries had a significant effect on the PRC's export and do they really have trade remedy 
effects on domestic industries? 
 
The empirical research on antidumping other than the PRC’s case has mostly focused 
on the antidumping law in the eurozone and the US while the existing literature in connection 
with the PRC mainly focus on the antidumping cases filed by the PRC. In order to shed more 
light on the efficacy of antidumping law, we focus on the antidumping cases in the US petitioned 
against the PRC. Analysis of the impact from these cases on the bilateral international trade 
between the US and the PRC helps provide a credible basis on the effectiveness of the US 
antidumping policy and the various factors that affect the final results of antidumping. 
 
We present the evidence of the trade restriction effects. However, the efficacy of an 
imposition of antidumping tariff is short-lived and feeble while it creates trade diversion effects. 
Additionally, it effectively raises the price of the product concerned, especially price of imports 
from the PRC. We also find that the level of antidumping duty, PRC's market position in US 
market, and the importance of US market share in the PRC significantly affect the impact of 
antidumping measures. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A. Dumping and Antidumping 
 
In the history of the development of international trade, the ideal of free trade, based on the 
principles of efficiency and welfare maximization has never been achieved in the real world. 
Gomory and Baumol (2000)  considered that, there is an inherent conflict of interest in 
international trade. They tried to explain the causes of trade friction from the perspective of the 
developing and changing of productivity. In the modern world economy, the increase of 
productivity in one country usually undermines other countries’ overall welfare. International 
trade is not likely to promote the welfare of all trading nations, but rather cause the interest 
conflict among the trading partners. 
 
Specifically, an industrial country will benefit from the process of general increase of 
productivity caused by the development of emerging industries in notably backward trading 
partners. This process may continue until its trading partner reaches a much more important 
position in the global market. Since then, the industrial development in the trading partner would 
be detrimental to the developed countries. In other words, the trade effects to both sides in the 
international trade are uncertain. After a turning point, the targets of effective competition and 
free trade may be realized at the expense of decreasing the total welfare in one country, rather 
than maximizing the welfare in both countries as the ideal was. 
 
The trade policy in one country inevitably designs to protect its domestic industries. The 
wave of trade protectionism has never been dissipated in the past decades. However, the forms 
of trade protectionism are showing new development trends and characteristics. The means of 
trade protection are becoming more and more subtle and diversified. Tariff and nontariff trade 
barriers such as quotas, licenses, etc., are widely used in various countries.  
 
Accordingly, the study on the validity and rationality of trade restrictions and protections 
has never stopped. 
 
The trend of the new trade protectionism quickly spreads over the world and the scope 
of trade friction is increasing. In addition to the trade conflicts among developed countries, the 
trade frictions between developed and developing countries get more attention. This paper 
examines the increasingly frequent trade frictions between the US and PRC from the 
perspective of antidumping. 
 
According to the Article VI of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), dumping 
is defined as 
 
…by which products of one country are introduced into the commerce of another 
country at less than the normal value of the products, is to be condemned if it 
causes or threatens material injury to an established industry in the territory of a 
contracting party or materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry. 
 
Based on the Antidumping Agreement made by the WTO, dumping should have three 
significant characteristics. Dumping should be the behavior of selling products at the price less 
than the normal value of these products. This behavior brings substantial harm or threat of 
substantial damage to the relevant industries in the importing countries. The low-cost sales and 
damage to the industries should have a causal relationship. 
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Antidumping refers to the measures taken by one country against dumping of products 
from foreign countries or regions in its domestic market. When a country’s dumping brings harm 
to the industry and market of the importers, the importing country or region can initiate an 
investigation, impose antidumping duties if necessary, and adopt other measures to restrict the 
imports of relevant products. According to Article VI of GATT, the importing country can impose 
antidumping duty that not exceeds the dumping margin. This provision is the earliest 
antidumping agreement. Since then, several negotiations were held, such as Kennedy Round in 
1967, the Tokyo Round in 1979, and the Uruguay Round in 1993. After in-depth discussion, 
they amended the antidumping agreement and added more details to the conditions of 
antidumping initiation, investigation procedures, and antidumping measures. 
 
In the US, the Import Administration of International Trade Administration of Department 
of Commerce (DOC) and the International Trade Commission (ITC) are responsible for the 
investigation and determination of antidumping cases. The investigation procedures include: 
Petition Filed; Initiation of Investigation; ITC Preliminary Determination; DOC Send 
Questionnaire; DOC Preliminary Determination; DOC On-Site Verification; DOC Final 
Determination; ITC Final Determination; and Antidumping Order. 
 
B.   Overview of Antidumping against the PRC 
 
Since the first antidumping investigation on the PRC in 1979, due to PRC’s rapid economic 
development and international trade growth the amount of antidumping investigations and 
measures against the PRC have substantially risen. Also, the proportion of antidumping cases 
against the PRC to the total number of antidumping cases in the world has increased each year. 
 
From 1 Jan 1995 to 31 Dec 2011, 4,010 antidumping investigations were initiated 
globally, of which 2,601 cases were imposed antidumping measures. In these cases, 
investigations and measures against the PRC reached up to 853 and 630, respectively 
(Table 1). Their respective shares of the total number of global antidumping investigations and 
measures were 21% and 24%. Both the overall quantity and the annual volume of cases against 
the PRC are among the first in the world. In addition, other countries have strengthened their 
efforts on antidumping against the PRC and the number of antidumping investigations and 
measures against the PRC has substantially increased since 1998. As the PRC’s export growth 
is expected to be sustained and stable, it will inevitably face more trade frictions in the future. 
About 74% of all the antidumping investigations against the PRC end with implementing 
measures, which is almost 10% higher than the world average.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Antidumping Investigations and its Measures 
 
Year 
Total Number 
of Global AD 
Investigations 
Number of AD 
Investigations 
against  
the PRC 
Percentage of 
the PRC 
(%) 
Total Number 
of Global AD 
Measures 
Number of AD 
Measures 
against 
the PRC 
Percentage of 
the PRC 
(%) 
1995 157 20 13 119 26 22 
1996 226 43 19 92 16 17 
1997 246 33 13 127 33 26 
1998 266 28 11 181 24 13 
1999 358 42 12 190 21 11 
2000 298 44 15 237 30 13 
2001 371 55 15 170 32 19 
2002 315 51 16 218 36 17 
2003 234 53 23 224 41 18 
2004 220 49 22 154 44 29 
2005 202 56 28 138 41 30 
2006 203 72 35 140 38 27 
2007 165 62 38 108 48 44 
2008 213 76 36 139 53 38 
2009 209 77 37 141 56 40 
2010 171 43 25 123 53 43 
2011 155 49 32 98 37 38 
Total 4,010 853 21 2,601 630 24 
AD = antidumping, PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
Source: WTO Trade Topics. http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm 
 
 
Most antidumping cases against the PRC are distributed among several main importing 
countries/regions in the world (Figures 1 and 2). Over the past decade, India, the US, the EU, 
Argentina, and Turkey were the top five countries/regions that initiated most antidumping cases 
against the PRC. These five countries/regions had one thing in common, having close bilateral 
trade relationship with the PRC.  
 
 
Figure 1: Top 10 Countries/Regions that Initiated Most AD Investigations  
against the PRC* (number of cases) 
 
 
AD = antidumping, PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
* Based on the data published in WTO Website, from 1 Jan 1995 to 31 Dec 2011. 
Source: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm 
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Figure 2: Top 10 Countries/Regions that Implemented Most AD Measures  
against the PRC* (number of cases) 
 
 
Based on the data published in WTO Website, from 1 Jan 1995 to 31 Dec 2011. 
Source: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm 
 
 
The popularity of invisible trade barriers, in particular the antidumping laws, have 
spurred a large body of literature. In principle, the use of antidumping measures should be 
limited to instances of unfair foreign imports. However, James (2000) pointed out that although 
antidumping is legal according to the GATT (WTO) rules, it is a threat to the basic principles of 
reciprocity and nondiscrimination, to which we try to adhere for decades when building the 
multilateral trading system. Antidumping is the most important nontariff trade barrier and the 
intention of antidumping is to correct the unfair dumping practices (Zanardi 2004).  
 
Nevertheless, it has been generally regarded as a success of new forms of 
protectionism, basically without any relationship with dumping. Aggarwal (2004) shared the view 
that antidumping is a protectionist tool and loses the contact with unfair trade practices of 
foreign companies. In the modern antidumping laws, antidumping is a form of protectionism 
which has been cleverly designed. It is also a major obstacle to free and fair trading relations 
(Prusa 2005). The US antidumping law was intended to prevent foreign companies selling 
goods at unfair prices in US market and ensure the fairness of competitions; notwithstanding, 
antidumping law becomes an excuse to shield some special interest groups at the expense of 
consumers and other businesses (Mankiw and Swagel 2005). 
 
There are also some previous research focusing on the US antidumping barriers to trade 
and its development trends. The US has been a leader in reducing other forms of protection 
and, correspondingly, a leader in increasing antidumping activities. Due to the weakening of the 
standard definition of dumping, the US DOC always made affirmative decisions in antidumping 
cases (Blonigen and Bown 2003). Therefore, whether the antidumping measures implemented 
almost depended on the injury decisions made by the US ITC. The proportion of affirmative 
injury decisions made by the US ITC in all the cases showed an upward trend. It increased from 
45% in the early 1980s to 60% in 2000 (Blonigen 2003). This change reflected the level of 
protection in the US against dumping was sharply increasing. Adjustment of the US antidumping 
laws after the Uruguay Round was considered as the reason why the number of antidumping 
investigations was increasing rapidly (Baldwin 2005). The Antidumping Law Amendment 
allowed US enterprises get import protection more easily through antidumping. 
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The PRC's WTO accession agreement contained a very strict antidumping and 
safeguard measures conditions. The PRC's trading partners can take advantage of these 
provisions and create a higher trade barrier, such as the use of nonmarket economy status in 
antidumping investigations against the PRC, the use of special transitional product-specific 
safeguard clause (Messerlin 2004). Jiang and Ellinger (2003) argue that antidumping laws are 
nonreciprocal for the PRC due to the following five reasons. The PRC's export subsidies 
exacerbated interprovincial price competition for overseas market share, which triggered a large 
number of antidumping investigations and the PRC is regarded as nonmarket economy and 
adopted Replacement Country System during investigations, which does not consider the 
inherent competitive advantage in the labor cost of PRC’s products. The PRC’s exporters lack 
defense capabilities and control abilities facing antidumping allegations, encouraging other 
countries to initiate more antidumping investigations against the PRC. The PRC's rapid growth 
of exports leads to the importing countries’ defense. They tried to weaken the PRC's 
competitiveness of their products and protect local enterprises using antidumping strategy. 
 
The trade friction between the PRC, the largest targeting economy of antidumping and 
the US, being the leader in increasing antidumping activity, has naturally drawn a lot of 
attention. White and Jones (2000) found that the US antidumping duties imposed heavy 
burdens to the bilateral trade between the PRC and the US. The US exaggerated the dumping 
margin of the PRC's exports (Mallon and Whalley 2004). Blonigen and Bown (2003) examined 
the US antidumping actions and found that it seldom initiated investigations against the main 
importers of US products or those who adopted antidumping measures actively. On the 
contrary, the less US products exported to one country and the weaker capacity it had to take 
retaliatory antidumping actions, more likely the country would be the target of the US 
antidumping actions. The asymmetry of the antidumping capacities of the US and the PRC 
might contribute to the huge amount of the US antidumping cases against the PRC. 
 
In this field, most empirical studies have focused on the paths and the effects of 
antidumping. This paper focuses on the latter. The economic impacts brought by antidumping 
exist in many aspects such as the trade restriction effect, the trade diversion effect, and its 
impacts on the public interests. The trade restriction effect and the trade diversion effect have a 
direct impact on the effectiveness of antidumping policy. Therefore, it aroused widespread 
concern. 
 
Straiger and Wolak (1994) conducted empirical research on the trade effects of 
antidumping and analyzed statistics in accordance with the SIC classification of the US 
antidumping cases from 1980 to 1985. They found significant “harassment effect” (investigation 
effect) and import diversion effect, i.e., antidumping investigations significantly reduced imports 
from the named countries. At the same time, they caused the increase of the similar products’ 
imports from the non-named countries. However, since they only collected data for only 1 year 
after the petition was filed, long-term effects were ignored.  
 
Krupp and Pollard (1996) also examined the effects of antidumping actions using 
monthly product-specific data from the U.S. Chemicals and Allied Products industry (TSUSA) 
level import data in the chemical industry between 1976 and 1988. Their analogous results 
showed that in approximately half the number of cases, antidumping investigation itself and the 
affirmative decision reduced the imports from named countries, while increasing the import from 
the non-named countries. However, they did not address the general issue of diversion since 
they used the disaggregated data for only a single industry. 
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Prusa (1996) also controlled the aggregation issue using the time series data from 1978 
to 1993, which comprised of 109 rejected cases and 126 cases where duties were levied. He 
examined the trade effects for named countries imports, non-named countries imports, and 
overall imports in the 5 years after the petition was filed. He found evidence of investigation 
effects, trade restriction effects and trade diversion effects. Later, Prusa (2001) added the data 
of settled cases into his data set on the basis of the preliminary studies. Comparing the trade 
effects in three different categories, which were settled cases, affirmative cases and rejected 
cases, he found that in either settled cases or cases resulted in duties, the value of imports from 
named countries fell by 50%–70% over the first 3 years of protection, and, even if the case was 
rejected, the imports fell by 15%–20%.  
 
Brenton (2001) used a similar least squares regression on 98 cases of the EU from 1989 
to 1994. He also found significant trade restriction effects and trade diversion effects. However, 
Lasagni (2000) and Konings, Vandenbussche, and Springael (2001) did not find any significant 
trade diversion effect using data of antidumping cases in the EU during a different period. 
 
 
III. IMPACT OF ANTIDUMPING DUTIES 
 
A. Data Description 
 
In order to examine the trade effects of antidumping cases, the information of antidumping 
cases were collected and time series trade data for each case were constructed. We set the 
year that the preliminary dumping decision was made as the base year 0 .t  We collected the 
information of all the antidumping cases of the US against the PRC that were preliminary judged 
between 1996 and 2008. The data on antidumping investigations include information about 
products, the countries involved in each case, the date of each investigation procedure, and 
outcomes including details on the structure of measures. 
 
In order to construct the time series trade data, we acquired the Harmonized System 
(HS) product code for each antidumping investigation filed for 13 years. Time series for products 
involved in the antidumping cases were constructed from 1994 to 2011. To examine the trade 
effects in the next 3 years following the preliminary dumping decision, we need the trade data of 
6 years for each case. We had a pool of 114 items involved in 62 cases. In the pool, seven 
cases (13 items) were not affirmative in the preliminary judgment and 55 cases (101 items) 
were affirmative and to be imposed preliminary antidumping measure, which was ad valorem 
duty. 
 
B. Descriptive Statistical Analysis 
 
Considering the trade volume in some antidumping cases amounts to hundreds of millions while 
in others the trade volume is only in a few million and even less, the diversity of antidumping 
cases complicates matters. Percentage changes of all variables relative to their value in the 
base year, representing the preliminary dumping decision was made are compared with 
percentage changes relative to their value in the year 2t  in order to find the trade effect of 
antidumping investigation, since the investigation always happened in the year before the 
preliminary dumping decision was made. 
 
The trade effects of antidumping include the investigation effect, the trade restriction 
effect, and the trade diversion effect. If antidumping investigation and measure have significant 
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restrictive impact on the trade from the target country, the antidumping action becomes efficient. 
However, if trade diversion effect is confirmed, the effect of antidumping is weakened since the 
increase of imports from non-named countries offsets the decrease of imports from named 
countries. The overall effect is uncertain since the direction of the change of domestic products’ 
market share depends on the total imports from both named (target) countries and non-named 
(non-target) countries. 
 
In this passage, we divide cases into two categories, the high-duty cases and the low-
duty cases. The high-duty cases refer to the cases that are subject to the preliminary 
antidumping duties greater than the median duty in the data set, and the low-duty cases less 
than or equal to the median. The line labeled “Duties Levied” shows the average level of all the 
cases that are subject to preliminary antidumping duties. The case for high duty will likely have 
more significant impact on trade restriction and diversion than the case for low duty. Taking into 
account the huge fluctuations of individual trade data seriously affect the validity of the average, 
in order to avoid the interference and see the overall trend clearly, we remove the outliers 
whose fluctuation range exceeds 200% comparing with the base year (year t0 or year t–2) 
amount in the descriptive statistical analysis. 
 
From the analysis based on the antidumping cases of the US against the PRC from 
1994 to 2009, we can clearly see the trade restriction and diversion effects. Since the number of 
rejected cases is much smaller than the number of duty levied cases, we focus on the duty 
levied cases in our analysis. 
 
 1. Impact of Antidumping Duties 
 
The application of antidumping law can deteriorate the terms of trade and cause a welfare loss 
for importing countries. Antidumping duties are endogenously determined since their 
applications will depend on the prices charged by the exporting firms. Exporting firms will have 
an incentive to raise their prices even if there is only a threat of antidumping duties being 
imposed, and to raise them even further if the duties are actually imposed. In order to 
understand the impact of antidumping duties, we follow the administration procedure of the 
laws. 
 
In the first period, the DOC compares the free on board (FOB) price received by the 
foreign exporter 1( )P T  with its own home price ,P
  where 1P  denotes the cost, insurance, 
freight (CIF) price and T is an iceberg transportation cost. If 1P T P
  then the DOC 
recommends duties in the second period of 2 1(1 ) ( ) 1P P T    . The exporter has an 
incentive to raise the CIF price 1P  to lower the antidumping duty 2.  An increase in 1P  occurs 
before the duty has been imposed; therefore, the importing country does not collect any tariff 
revenue and this price increase amounts to the terms of trade loss for the importer. For the 
withdrawal cases, the US firms negotiate with the PRC exporting firms on the level of prices and 
market share. The withdrawal cases have about the same impact on reducing import quantity as 
do actual duties. 
 
We consider a continuing investigation process, denoting that 2P  is the antidumping 
duty inclusive import price. In the third period, the DOC review FOB price  2 2(1 )P T   for the 
foreign exporter. If  2 2(1 ) ,P T P    then the antidumping duty to be imposed is 
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 3 2 2(1 ) (1 ) 1,P P T         in which there is a built-in continuation of the antidumping 
duties, even if the foreign firm chooses 2 .P P T
   A charge of dumping can be avoided in the 
second period if and only if  2 2(1 ) ,P T P    or 2 2 1 2(1 ) (1 ).P P T P      The foreign firm 
increases its second period price above what was charged in the first period and further 
increases 2P  by the full amount of 2.  As we note from the following inequality 2 1 2(1 ),P P    
there will be more than complete antidumping tariff rate pass-through. 
 
 2. Trade Restriction Effects 
 
Figures 3 and 4 present changes of quantity and value imported from the PRC to the US during 
the 3 years after the preliminary dumping decision was made. We find that the antidumping 
measures have immediate effects on both import quantity and value. Comparing with imports in 
the base year 0 ,t  the imports from the PRC dropped markedly in the following year 1,t  in which 
the import quantity and value were reduced by 12% and 15% compared to the base year 0 ,t  
respectively. Nevertheless, the trade restriction effects are short-lived. The trade quantity and 
value exceeded their 0t  level by the years 3t  and 2,t  respectively. 
 
In particular, as expected, the amount of duty plays a key role in how restrictive an 
antidumping case is. Further, we compare those cases of duties greater than the median with 
those of duties smaller than the median. The restriction effect of antidumping measures for the 
cases with higher than the median is much more significant than for the cases with lower than 
the median, both on the quantity and value of trade. The duration of the restriction effect is 
extended for the cases of duties greater than the median.  
 
 
Figure 3: Quantity of US Imports from the PRC (3 years) 
 
 
 
PRC = People’s Republic of China, US = United States. 
Source: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm 
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Figure 4: Value of US Imports from the PRC (3 years) 
 
 
 
PRC = People’s Republic of China, US = United States. 
Source: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm 
 
 
To examine the investigation and trade restriction effects, we plot the trade data of 
2 years prior to and 3 years subsequent to preliminary decision was made into consideration. 
The antidumping investigations occur in the year 1t  and most filed cases are decided within 
1 year except under unusual circumstances. Figures 5 and 6 present changes of quantity and 
value imported from the PRC to the US from 2t  to 3.t  Clearly, the year 1t  is a point of 
inflection. Since the year 1,t  the import quantity begins to turn down sharply. On the whole, the 
value of imports in duties levied cases also shows a decline after year 1t  and a further decline 
in the year 1,t  the year after antidumping measures imposed. The antidumping investigation 
itself has had some restriction effects on the related products. It is most apparent for high-duty 
cases, consistent with Straiger and Wolak (1994), and Prusa (1996). Since there is an 
expectation of antidumping duties, the exporters in the PRC may take the initiative to reduce 
their exports to the US and increase the price to avoid the punitive antidumping duties.  
 
Figure 5: Quantity of US Imports from the PRC (5 years) 
 
 
 
PRC = People’s Republic of China, US = United States. 
Source: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm 
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Figure 6: Value of US Imports from the PRC (5 years) 
 
 
 
PRC = People’s Republic of China, US = United States. 
Source: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm 
 
 
 3. Trade Diversion Effects 
 
Although the US antidumping actions restrict the imports from the PRC, they can lead to the 
increase of imports from other countries, which offset the trade remedy effects on domestic 
industries to a large extent. Krupp and Pollard (1996) and Prusa (1996) find the trade diversion 
effect that the non-named countries benefit from the antidumping actions against named 
countries, expanding their exports to the applicant state and increase their market share in the 
segment market. When duties are levied at 1,t  both the quantity and value of imports from other 
countries increase substantially while it is quite opposite when the case is rejected (Figures 7 
and 8).  
 
The overall growth trend of import value from other countries sustains until the year 2.t  
Afterwards, the average value of imports flattens. This is opposite from the changes of imports 
from the PRC and consistent with the trade diversion effect theory. The restriction on imports 
from the PRC is gradually weakened over time. In the year 3,t  the value of imports from the 
PRC rebounds and exceeds the level of the year that preliminary decision was made followed 
by feeble trade diversion effects. The market share of other countries is no longer affected by 
the decrease of imports from the PRC and becomes stable, or even falls.  
 
For the rejected cases, the value and quantity of imports begin to decline after a brief 
increase in the year 1t  and falls below the level in the base year 0,t  due to the quick rebound 
and sustained growth of imports from the PRC. In addition, the diversion effect is stronger for 
high-duty cases than for low-duty cases. The imports in high-duty cases grow more significantly 
in the early years after duties imposed and decrease more substantially in the later year 
(Figures 7 and 8).  
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Figure 7: Quantity of US Imports from Other Countries (3 years) 
 
 
 
US = United States. 
Source: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm 
 
 
Figure 8: Value of US Imports from Other Countries (3 years) 
 
 
 
US = United States. 
Source: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm 
 
 
Similarly, the trade diversion effect has occurred even before duties are imposed. The 
imports from non-named countries in duties levied cases began to increase from the base year 
0t  (Figures 9 and 10). The imports in high-duty cases show a greater increase in the base year 
0t  comparing with that in low-duty cases. We can see the influence of investigation more clearly 
for the rejected cases. In the year 1,t  the investigation year, the quantity and value of imports 
from other countries in rejected cases have significant increases. However, in the year the 
antidumping measures are imposed, the imports fall back to the level in the year 2,t  or even 
less. After then, the import in rejected cases never exceeds that during investigations. The 
increase of imports in rejected cases in the year 1t  can be interpreted as the investigation itself 
has a certain impact on the trade diversion. The diversion effect during investigation period is 
much more substantial in the rejected cases, which is consistent with Prusa’s (1996) finding. It 
bears further study; however, there are not enough samples of rejected cases in our data set. 
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Figure 9: Quantity of US Imports from Other Countries (5 years)  
 
 
 
US = United States. 
Source: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm 
 
 
Figure 10: Value of US Imports from Other Countries (5 years)  
 
 
US = United States. 
Source: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm 
 
 
In order to better observe the trade diversion effect, we make comparison of imports 
from the PRC and other countries in duty levied cases (Figures 11 and 12). It is more 
perceivable in these figures that there is a negative correlation between imports from the PRC 
and imports from other countries during the investigation and the early days after duty levied. In 
the year the preliminary decision is made, there is a substantial decline in the US imports from 
the PRC, while the US imports from other countries are growing. The same happens in the year 
1.t  From the year 2,t  the imports from the PRC rebound. Accordingly, the growth rate of 
imports from other countries begins to fall, a process of the disappearing of trade diversion 
effects along with the weakening of trade restriction effects. 
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Figure 11: Quantity of Imports in Duty Levied Cases (PRC vs. other countries) 
 
 
PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
Source: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm 
 
 
Figure 12: Value of Imports in Duty Levied Cases (PRC vs. other countries) 
 
 
PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
Source: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm 
 
 
 4. Analysis of the Effects on Unit Value 
 
The application of an antidumping law can deteriorate the terms of trade for the importing 
nation, (i.e., the US). Would antidumping measures improve the prices of the PRC’s products 
effectively? We investigate its effects on prices by examining the changes in unit value and the 
antidumping duty seems to improve the prices of the products concerned. Figure 13 depicts the 
effects of antidumping actions on unit values in duty levied cases. The overall unit value in duty 
levied cases is 10 percentage points higher than that in the year 2,t  one year before petition 
was filed. The higher the duty is levied, the larger the increase in unit value is.  
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Figure 13: Unit Value in Duty Levied Cases (PRC) 
 
 
PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
Source: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm 
 
 
In Figure 14, we compare the average price change of import from the PRC with that of 
import from non-named countries. Before the petition is filed, the unit value of the PRC’s 
products declines, affected by the dumping actions while the unit value of non-named countries’ 
products remains stable. However, from the year 1,t  when the petition was filed, the unit values 
of imports from both the PRC and non-named countries steadily rose. The antidumping actions 
have significant impact on the prices of imports. The adoption of antidumping duties rapidly 
improves the prices of the imports from the PRC. It also spurs price increases by other foreign 
rivals. 
 
 
Figure 14: Unit Value in Duty Levied Cases (PRC vs. other countries) 
 
 
PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
Source: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm 
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IV. EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
A. Regression Models 
 
Based on the model in Prusa’s (1996) paper, we modify regression models.  
 
1 1 2, 0 , 1 , , 2 3 4
5 6 7 , 8 , ,
ln ln ln( / ) ln
* Im , 0,1,2,3.
j j j j
j j j
i t i t i t i t i i
j j i i t i t i t
q q q q Named Duty WTO
t t Dec Perc ExPerc j
     
    
       
       (1) 
 
1 1 2, 0 , 1 , , 2 3 4
5 6 7 , 8 , ,
ln ln ln( / ) ln
* Im , 0,1,2,3.
j j j j
j j j
i t i t i t i t i i
j j i i t i t i t
v v v v Named Duty WTO
t t Dec Perc ExPerc j
     
    
       
       (2) 
 
The variables , ji tq  and , ji tv  are the quantity and value of import for product i in the 
antidumping case at time ,jt  respectively, where 0t  corresponds to the base year that the 
preliminary dumping decision was made, and 1t  through 3t  are the years following the outcome. 
The variable iNamed  is a dummy variable (= 1 when three or more countries were named in 
the correspondent case and zero otherwise). Previous literature pointed out that the number of 
countries named might have an effect on the strength of trade diversion effects. The variable 
iDuty  denotes the size of the duty. We set iDuty  equal to 1 for the rejected cases. Considering 
the influence of the PRC’s accession to WTO in 2001, we add a dummy variable, WTO (= 1 
from year 2001), to capture the WTO membership effect. The variable iDec  is the decision 
dummy variable (= 1 if duties were levied).  
 
The variable , ji tImPerc  denotes the PRC’s market share of product i in the US. The 
market share can be calculated by the import quantity (value) of product i from the PRC to the 
US divided by the import quantity (value) to the US from the world. The variable , ji tExPerc  is 
defined by the export quantity (value) of product i from the PRC to the US divided by the total 
export quantity (value) of product i from the PRC to the world, representing the importance of 
US market to the PRC.  
 
It should be noted that, when we run regressions on different explained variables, , ji tq
 and , ji tv  denote imports from different countries. For example, when we run a regression on the 
US imports from the PRC, , ji tq  and , ji tv  denote imports from the PRC. Likewise, when we do 
regression on the US imports from the other countries, , ji tq  and , ji tv  denote imports from the 
other countries.  
 
The larger market share the PRC takes in the US market, the higher degree of the US 
dependence on import from the PRC. Even with antidumping duties and higher prices, the 
import from the PRC might not decrease sharply. The effects of antidumping measures will be 
weak for those products with large market shares. Similarly, if the US is one of the main trading 
partners of the PRC, the exporters in the PRC might not be able to switch from the US market to 
other countries’ markets in a short term. Therefore, the larger , ji tExPerc  is, the weaker effect of 
antidumping measures would have.  
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B. Estimation Results 
 
1. US Imports from the PRC 
 
The impacts of antidumping measures on imports from the PRC are shown in columns (1), (2), 
(7), and (8) in Table 2 and Table 3. The general trends depicted in the figures in the previous 
section also emerged from the regressions. 
 
First, the antidumping duties have significant restriction effects on both the quantity and 
the value of imports. In all the four regressions, the coefficients of iInDuty  are negative and in 
columns (1), (7), and (8), the coefficients are significant at 5%. However, the trade restriction 
effect appears only in the first year after the preliminary decision was made, which is the year 
1,t  and then disappears after year 2.t  Among all the three time dummies, only the partial 
regression coefficients of 1t  are negative. After the second year, the imports from the PRC 
rebound significantly. Apparently, the impact of antidumping measures on trade between the 
PRC and the US is quite short lived. The cross effects are negative in year 1t  and 3.t  Especially, 
the cross effect in year 3t  is large and significant, revealing that the decisions of imposing 
antidumping duties can enhance the restriction effects in the years following year 0,t  especially 
in year 3.t  The cross effect has a certain time lag. 
 
Second, we can observe that although the trade has a certain continuity, there is a 
change of the trade trends in year 0.t  The positive correlation between the imports in year 0t  
and that in year 1t  is high and significant. Meanwhile, the coefficients of 1 2, ,ln  ( / )j ji t i tq q   and 
1 2, ,
ln  ( / )
j ji t i t
v v
   are negative and significant, implying that the trade has continuity. On the other 
hand, the trade trend has already changed in year 0,t  which may be caused by the direct effects 
of antidumping measure or the antidumping investigation itself in year 1.t  
 
Third, the PRC’s market share in the US market and the importance of the US as a trade 
partner would significantly affect the efficiency of antidumping measures imposed on the PRC. 
The coefficients of , ji tImPerc  and , ji tExPerc  are positive and significant, reflecting the larger 
market share the PRC takes in the US market, the weaker the restriction effects would be; the 
larger proportion the US takes in the PRC’s overall exports, the weaker the restriction effects 
will be. It is reasonable from the market dependence and the trade diffusion effect points of view 
explained in the previous section. 
 
2. US Imports from Other Countries/Overall Imports 
 
The impacts of antidumping measures on imports from the other countries are shown in 
columns (5), (6), (11), and (12) in Tables 2 and 3. The results are consistent with our findings on 
trade diversion effects in the descriptive statistical analysis section. 
 
First, the antidumping measures increase the quantity and the value of imports from 
other countries. The coefficients of ilnDuty  in all the four regressions are positive. The one in 
the regression on import value is even significant. Moreover, the time effect dummies are all 
positive and in particular, the time effects in year 1t  and 2t  are significant while their coefficients 
are declining as time goes by. These findings provide evidence for the trade diversion effect. 
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There is trade diversion during the 3 years of our investigation and the effect is particularly 
strong in the first 2 years following year 0.t  The impact is most substantial in year 1t  and 
becomes weaker as time goes by. The cross-effects are positive too, presenting that the 
affirmative dumping decisions enhance the trade diversion effects in the following years. 
 
Second, the imports from other countries in year 0t  have significant positive correlation 
with that in the previous year. The partial regression coefficients of 
1, ji t
lnq
  and 1, ji tlnv   are large 
and statistically significant at 1% level. On the one hand, this fact reflects that the trade has 
continuity while it suggests that the impact on US imports from other countries in the year that 
preliminary decision was made is limited. 
 
Third, correspond to the impact of variable , ji tImPerc  on the trade restriction effect, the 
larger market share the PRC takes in the US market, the stronger the trade diversion effect is. 
However, the coefficients are small and that of , ji tExPerc  is even positive. It is not surprising 
taking into account that we used the trade data of all the exporters other than the PRC instead 
of the trade data of the non-named countries. Nevertheless, the coefficients are not significant; 
therefore, the direction of influence of , ji tImPerc  and , ji tExPerc  on the trade diversion effect 
cannot be identified in this case. 
 
Finally, antidumping actions’ impacts on US overall imports are small and insignificant. 
In regressions (3), (4), (9), and (10), the effects of iDuty  are small and insignificant and the 
signs of coefficients are mixed. Therefore, the effects of antidumping measures on US overall 
imports are not significant and the direction of influence is not certain because of the opposite 
impacts of the trade restriction effect and trade diversion effect. In summary, the US 
antidumping actions against the PRC cannot realize the protection of domestic enterprises. 
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Table 2: OLS Estimates of Quantity of US Imports 
 
Variables 
Imports from The PRC Imports from World Imports from Others
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
  
Ln(Quantity in tj–1) 0.857*** 0.920*** 1.005*** 0.999*** 0.995*** 0.993*** 
(0.0359) (0.0299) (0.0114) (0.0123) (0.00971) (0.00919) 
% change in Quantity 
between tj–1 and tj–2 –0.142* –0.157* –0.0498 –0.0389 0.0208 0.0198 
(0.0796) (0.0856) (0.0752) (0.0741) (0.0592) (0.0593) 
Number Named>=3  
(Dummy Variable) 
–0.00551 –0.0289 –0.00377 –0.00680 –0.00294 –0.00222 
(0.0368) (0.0365) (0.00895) (0.00852) (0.00846) (0.00820) 
Ln(Duty) –0.131** –0.0837 –0.00701 –0.00593 0.0178 0.0158 
(0.0598) (0.0608) (0.0163) (0.0161) (0.0173) (0.0175) 
WTO 0.0626 0.105 –0.0113 0.00506 –0.0412 –0.0314 
(0.108) (0.113) (0.0409) (0.0420) (0.0384) (0.0378) 
Years Following 
P_Dump_Dec 
(Dummy Variables) 
t1 –0.202 –0.288* 0.0513 0.0496 0.123*** 0.136*** 
(0.156) (0.170) (0.0525) (0.0543) (0.0458) (0.0454) 
t2 0.109 0.0522 0.0888* 0.0885 0.0589 0.0731 
(0.143) (0.153) (0.0520) (0.0540) (0.0479) (0.0489) 
t3 0.338** 0.326** 0.0963* 0.0992* 0.0321 0.0431 
(0.152) (0.158) (0.0535) (0.0543) (0.0441) (0.0438) 
Cross-effect: 
Years*Decision 
t1_dec –0.252 0.0768 0.0142 0.0392 0.0652 0.0518 
(0.408) (0.411) (0.125) (0.124) (0.129) (0.129) 
t2_dec 0.0487 0.403 0.0750 0.101 0.162 0.144 
(0.597) (0.637) (0.123) (0.124) (0.123) (0.124) 
t3_dec –1.036 –0.786 –0.137 –0.117 0.0140 –0.00159 
(0.696) (0.738) (0.195) (0.194) (0.164) (0.162) 
ImPerc 1.776*** 0.159* –0.0721 
(0.375) (0.0963) (0.0693) 
ExPerc 0.185*** 0.0424*** 0.0490 
(0.0672) (0.0120) (0.0145) 
Constant 2.253*** 1.504*** –0.119 0.00912 0.0240 0.0317 
(0.567) (0.519) (0.205) (0.220) (0.198) (0.186) 
Observations 456 456 456 456 456 456 
R-squared 0.821 0.806 0.963 0.963 0.972 0.972 
OLS = ordinary least squares, PRC = People’s Republic of China, US = United States, WTO = World Trade Organization. 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 3：OLS Estimates of Value of US Imports 
 
Variables 
Imports from The PRC Imports from World Imports from Others
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
  
Ln(Value in tj–1) 0.879*** 0.948*** 1.007*** 1.007*** 0.997*** 0.998*** 
(0.0358) (0.0281) (0.0114) (0.0112) (0.00942) (0.00916) 
%△ Value between tj–1 
and tj–2 –0.0907 –0.158* –0.0256 –0.0299 0.0180 0.00895 
(0.0855) (0.0855) (0.0778) (0.0755) (0.0612) (0.0616) 
Number Named>=3  
(Dummy Variable) 
–0.0166 –0.0410 0.00389 –0.00311 0.00386 –0.000426 
(0.0335) (0.0344) (0.00769) (0.00764) (0.00733) (0.00734) 
Ln(Duty) –0.128** –0.115** 0.0124 0.00699 0.0295* 0.0252 
(0.0542) (0.0553) (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0162) (0.0161) 
WTO 0.142 0.0418 0.0243 0.00267 0.0110 –0.00890 
(0.107) (0.114) (0.0386) (0.0397) (0.0360) (0.0355) 
Years Following 
P_Dump_Dec  
(Dummy Variables) 
t1 –0.206 –0.286* 0.0465 0.0452 0.0952** 0.0984** 
(0.148) (0.156) (0.0418) (0.0431) (0.0391) (0.0394) 
t2 0.248** 0.197 0.107** 0.109** 0.0803** 0.0850** 
(0.119) (0.125) (0.0419) (0.0436) (0.0394) (0.0398) 
t3 0.375*** 0.396*** 0.0612 0.0776 0.0117 0.0233 
(0.129) (0.140) (0.0464) (0.0472) (0.0393) (0.0389) 
Cross-effect: 
Years*Decision 
t1_dec –0.362 –0.0858 0.116 0.128 0.148 0.142 
(0.367) (0.364) (0.113) (0.112) (0.117) (0.118) 
t2_dec –0.0555 0.115 0.181 0.169 0.210 0.196 
(0.558) (0.544) (0.141) (0.141) (0.142) (0.147) 
t3_dec –1.070* –1.344** 0.000654 -0.138 0.158 0.0326 
(0.630) (0.680) (0.180) (0.184) (0.149) (0.142) 
ImPerc 1.838*** 0.160 -0.0188 
(0.415) (0.103) (0.0659) 
ExPerc 0.267** 0.0468*** 0.0147 
(0.114) (0.0164) (0.0108) 
Constant 2.045*** 1.303** –0.255 –0.169 –0.0937 –0.0680 
(0.597) (0.523) (0.211) (0.214) (0.200) (0.196) 
Observations 456 456 456 456 456 456 
R-squared 0.852 0.846 0.971 0.972 0.975 0.976 
OLS = ordinary least squares, PRC = People’s Republic of China, US = United States, WTO = World Trade Organization. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we present the evidence for the trade restriction effect and the trade diversion 
effect through the examination of the trade patterns of the PRC and the other countries. We find 
that during the antidumping investigations, the trends of the US imports from the PRC have 
already been affected, which is consistent with previous literatures on the investigation effect. 
After year 0,t  the year that the preliminary decision was made, the imports from the PRC 
decrease sharply. However, the restriction effect is quite short lived. In addition, other countries 
benefit from the antidumping actions of the US against the PRC. Most of the protective effects 
of antidumping measures are offset by the increased imports from the countries other than the 
PRC. Overall, the impact of antidumping measures is insignificant on the total imports to the US. 
However, in another aspect, the antidumping measures do achieve some purpose: It effectively 
increases the prices of the products concerned, especially prices of imports from the PRC. In 
the other words, it is usually off-the-target from the policymakers and ends up raising the import 
prices which will negatively affect the consumers in the US. 
 
Furthermore, some factors will significantly affect the impact of antidumping measures, 
such as the level of antidumping duty, the PRC's market position in US market, and the 
importance of the US market to the PRC. Higher duties lead to stronger trade restriction effects 
and diversion effects. The larger market share the PRC takes in the US market, the weaker the 
restriction effects will be. The larger proportion the US takes in the PRC’s overall exports, the 
weaker the restriction effects will be. 
 
In recent years, there has been an increase in antidumping cases against the PRC filed 
in the US. The fact leaves little doubt that US enterprises will continue to frequently use 
antidumping laws to reduce the fierce import competition from the PRC’s exporters. The real 
effects of the US antidumping measures fall short of their expectations. The protection effect of 
antidumping actions is quite limited. For the PRC, the results suggest that increasing the market 
share the PRC takes and enhancing the PRC’s market position in the US by legal means is a 
way to weaken the impacts of US antidumping measures against the PRC. 
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